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SHOULD NONCOMMERCIAL
ASSOCIATIONS HAVE AN ABSOLUTE
RIGHT TO DISCRIMINATE?
ANDREW KOPPELMAN*
I
INTRODUCTION
In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,1 the Supreme Court held that the Boy Scouts of
America had the right to discriminate against gay people. The Court’s opinion is so
muddled that it is hard to know who, other than the Scouts themselves, will benefit
from it. A growing number of prominent scholars have suggested a clarification: that
noncommercial private associations should be given an absolute right to discriminate.
This clarification should be resisted.
Before Dale, American constitutional law’s treatment of freedom of association
followed what Dale Carpenter calls a “message-based approach”:2 if an association is
organized to express a viewpoint, then constitutional difficulties are raised by a statute
that requires it to accept unwanted members if that requirement would impair its ability to convey its message. This rule has become unclear because Dale introduced two
ambiguities into the law. First, it seemed to hold that substantial interference would
be found whenever an organization complained. Second, it seemed to hold that substantial burdens were per se unconstitutional, rather than merely subject to strict scrutiny. In effect, any plaintiff’s claim was so powerful that all antidiscrimination laws
were unconstitutional in all their applications. However, this rule is so patently silly
that the lower federal courts have refused to believe it and have rejected Dale claims
so consistently that they are on their way to confining Dale to its facts. The messagebased approach lives.
A notable group of commentators, whom I shall call the “neolibertarians,”3 have
responded to Dale’s ambiguity by advocating a sharper rule than any declared in the
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1. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
2. Dale Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law after Dale: A Tripartite Approach, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1515, 1517 (2001).
3. The restriction of the right to noncommercial associations is what makes them “neo.”
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Dale opinion: an absolute right of noncommercial associations to exclude unwanted
members. The group is a distinguished one, including Judge Michael McConnell and
Professors David Bernstein, Dale Carpenter, Richard Epstein, John McGinnis, Michael Paulsen, and Nancy Rosenblum. Their approach promises “to draw a line between [freedom of association and antidiscrimination law] that will preserve a large
realm for group expression and organization while allowing the state to promote its
equality objectives in the most compelling contexts.”4 A message-based approach, the
neolibertarians argue, gives government the opportunity to scrutinize and reshape private speech, and thereby violates the central purposes of the First Amendment. One
illustration of the pathology of a message-based approach, emphasized by several of
these writers and by the Dale Court as well, is that it produces perverse results: a
group that is stridently prejudiced will receive more protection than one that is quieter
about its views, and thus the rule creates an incentive to disseminate the very prejudices that antidiscrimination laws aim to temper.
What the neolibertarians describe as perverse effects of a message-based approach
are actually desirable ones. The pressure that a message-based approach brings to
bear on discriminatory associations is exactly the kind of result that antidiscrimination
law should strive to bring about, and it reaches it in a way that gives freedom of
speech all the respect that it deserves. A message-based approach does put some pressure on discriminatory associations: discrimination is not so cheap as it was before,
and a group will have to decide whether discrimination is worth the added cost. But
this pressure serves state interests of the highest order and does not prevent groups
with strongly held discriminatory ideas from uniting and disseminating them.
The neolibertarian arguments are only slightly modified versions of old, discredited libertarian objections to the existence of any antidiscrimination law at all. The
older, minimal-state libertarianism rests on three premises: (1) a more-than-minimal
state violates citizens’ rights (the Rights premise), (2) government cannot be trusted to
do more than prevent force and fraud (the Distrust premise), and (3) an unregulated
private sector can be relied on to produce benign results (the Optimism premise).
Libertarianism has failed as a normative theory because all three premises are often
false. The neolibertarian modification is to confine application of all three premises
only to noncommercial associations. But even thus restricted in scope, there is no reason to think that any of them is true as a general matter.
Part II of this article describes the confusion of the Dale opinion and what lower
courts have made of it. Part III surveys the arguments of the neolibertarians and
shows that their arguments are slightly modified versions of the old libertarian objections to antidiscrimination legislation of any kind. Part IV examines the state interests
that would be sacrificed by the neolibertarian rule, with special attention to the case of
the Boy Scouts. I argue that discrimination by noncommercial associations can inflict
considerable harms, and that the application of antidiscrimination norms to private associations may reflect members’ preferences better than one in which there is an unrestricted freedom to discriminate. Part V considers what would be the optimal rule of

4. Id.
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law, given these conflicting interests. Distrust of judicial decisionmakers does not
necessarily produce absolute protection of rights; it can lead the Court to withdraw
protection, as it did in Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith.5 Compared to the rigidities of either absolute protection or no protection, the ambiguous protection of the
message-based approach, which predated and largely survives Dale, is the wisest rule
after all.
II
THE CONFUSION OF DALE
The leading case before Dale that addressed the right to exclude was Roberts v.
United States Jaycees,6 in which the Court held that a state could constitutionally require an all-male association of young businessmen to admit women. The Court’s
opinion observed that the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment is
often exercised collectively, and so entails a certain degree of freedom of association.
This liberty in turn entails a right to exclude unwanted members:
There can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an association than a regulation that forces the group to accept members it does not desire. Such a
regulation may impair the ability of the original members to express only those views that
brought them together. Freedom of association therefore plainly presupposes a freedom not
7
to associate.

The Court limited the right it thus created, holding that infringements upon the
right to exclude could be justified by “compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive
of associational freedoms.”8 The result was a balancing test: antidiscrimination norms
could legitimately be imposed on associations if the state interest was great enough.
In practice, free association claims unrelated to viewpoint discrimination lost in the
Supreme Court.9
Then came Dale. The Dale case involved a New Jersey statute that prohibited
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The Scouts revoked James Dale’s
membership after a newspaper story (which did not mention his affiliation with the
Scouts) identified him as an officer of his college’s lesbian and gay student organization. Dale successfully sued under the statute. The Boy Scouts of America claimed
that the application of the law to them would violate their freedom of expression, but
the New Jersey Supreme Court, applying the Roberts test, was “not persuaded . . . that
a ‘shared goal’ of Boy Scout members is to associate in order to preserve the view that

5. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause was inapplicable because the state law was
one of general, neutral applicability).
6. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
7. Id. at 623.
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); N.Y. State Club
Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988). On the other hand, there is enough ambiguity in the language of
these decisions that Michael Paulsen is able plausibly to describe them as rare exceptions to a general rule of
freedom of association. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Scouts, Families, and Schools, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1917,
1924-28 (2001).
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homosexuality is immoral.”10 The Court noted that the Scouts had not, in their public
materials, taken any position whatsoever concerning the morality of homosexuality. It
therefore held “that Dale’s membership does not violate Boy Scouts’ right of expressive association because his inclusion would not ‘affect in any significant way [Boy
Scouts’] existing members’ ability to carry out [“those activities.”]’”11
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. It used the following reasoning:
(1) The Scouts are an association that “engages in expressive activity”12 protected
by the First Amendment.
(2) Forced inclusion of a member therefore violates the First Amendment if it
“would significantly affect the Boy Scouts’ ability to advocate public or private viewpoints.”13
(3) The Boy Scouts assert that homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the values
embodied in the Scout Oath and Law, particularly those represented by the requirement that Scouts be “morally straight” and “clean.”14
(4) The Court must give deference to an organization’s assertions regarding the
nature of its expression.
(5) The Court “must also give deference to an association’s view of what would
impair its expression.”15
(6) The Court should prevent forced association: “Dale’s presence in the Boy
Scouts would, at the very least, force the organization to send a message, both to the
youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a
legitimate form of behavior.”16
The opinion in Dale does not state a clear rule to guide lower courts, but it implies
either that all antidiscrimination laws are unconstitutional in all their applications or
that citizens are allowed to disobey laws whenever obedience would be perceived as
endorsing some message. The first rule is supported by propositions (1) through (5)
above, which together permit any defendant to allege a message to which courts must
defer. The second rule is supported by proposition (6), together with the Court’s invocation of the rule against compelled speech.17
Cases after Dale have revealed its potentially broad implications and lower courts’
reluctance to follow out those implications. Courts have rejected Dale–based chal-

10. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 734 A.2d 1196, 1223-24 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted), quoted
in Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647.
11. 734 A.2d at 1225, quoted in Dale, 530 U.S. at 647 (quoting Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 548).
12. Dale, 530 U.S. at 650.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 653.
16. Id.
17. This analysis of the Court’s opinion is developed in detail in Andrew Koppelman, Signs of the Times:
Dale v. Boy Scouts of America and the Changing Meaning of Nondiscrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1819
(2002). That essay critiques the work product of the Court, but does not deal with the deeper question, addressed by the present essay, of what constitutional protection ought to be given to freedom of association. For
a more detailed analysis of the doctrinal confusion introduced by Dale, see David McGowan, Making Sense of
Dale, 18 CONST. COMMENT 121 (2001).

03_KOPPELMAN_FMT.DOC

Autumn 2004]

2/16/2005 9:32 AM

AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO DISCRIMINATE?

31

lenges to a city ordinance prohibiting commercial sex clubs,18 a gun control statute
limiting the use of certain weapons to licensed gun clubs (effectively pressuring nonmembers to join such clubs),19 the use of undercover officers to enforce a prohibition
of “lap dancing,”20 a statute banning children’s access to a public, clothing-optional
park,21 a state university’s decision to strip a fraternity, where illegal drugs were
abused, of its status as a recognized student organization,22 and, not least, a city ordinance prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.23 The logic of the
Dale opinion made the claimants’ arguments colorable in all these cases, but the lower
courts were unwilling to follow that opinion’s logic to its conclusions. Only four reported cases follow Dale to uphold a claim of freedom of association.24 The Boy
Scouts themselves are a party in two of these, one of which carves out a category of
“nonexpressive” jobs in the Scouting organization, to which Dale does not apply.25
Another involves a males-only meeting conducted by the Nation of Islam, and thus
raises questions of the autonomy of religious groups that are different from those presented by ordinary association claims.26 Only one decision, released as this article was
going to press, upholds a Dale claim by a nonreligious association other than the Boy
Scouts. It invalidates a statute denying funding to colleges that prohibited on-campus
military recruiting.27 This case is the one exception to a general tendency, in the federal courts, to confine Dale to its facts.
III
THE NEOLIBERTARIAN REMEDY
The Court’s opinion is mud, but a number of notable scholars have advocated that
it be read to stand for a clear rule: noncommercial associations have an absolute right
to exclude anyone they like. This section will survey the arguments that have been

18. Recreational Developments of Phoenix, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1054 (D. Ariz. 2002).
19. Gun Owners’ Action League, Inc. v. Swift, 284 F.3d 198 (1st Cir. 2002).
20. City of Shoreline v. Club for Free Speech Rights, 36 P.3d 1058 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
21. Cent. Texas Nudists v. County of Travis, No. 03-00-00024-CV, 2000 Tex. App. Lexis 8136 (Tex. Ct.
App. Dec. 7, 2000).
22. Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435 (3d Cir. 2000).
23. Hyman v. City of Louisville, 132 F. Supp. 2d 528 (W.D. Ky. 2001).
24. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld, 2004 WL 2698052 (3d Cir. 2004); Boy
Scouts of Am. v. D.C. Comm’n On Human Rights, 809 A.2d 1192 (D.C. 2002); Donaldson v. Farrakhan, 762
N.E. 2d 835 (Mass. 2002); Chicago Area Council of Boy Scouts of Am. v. City of Chicago, 748 N.E.2d 759
(Ill. 1st Dist. 2001), appeal denied, 763 N.E.2d 316 (Ill. 2001).
25. Chicago Area Council, 748 N.E.2d at 759 (distinguishing nonexpressive positions). The other case is
Boy Scouts of Am. v. D.C. Comm’n on Human Rights, 809 A.2d 1192 (D.C. 2002). But even the Scouts have
gotten only limited mileage from Dale. The City of Berkeley was not prevented from revoking the Scouts’
privilege of docking their boats rent-free in the city’s marina. See Evans v. City of Berkeley, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d
696 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002), petition for review granted, 605 P.3d 402 (2003).
26. Donaldson, 762 N.E.2d 835. The internal autonomy of religious groups is a well-established doctrine
that has been held to survive the holding of Employment Division of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), that (as
a general matter) the Free Exercise Clause does not authorize the courts to carve out exemptions to generally
applicable laws when such laws burden religious activities. See Combs v. Cent. Texas Annual Conf. of the
United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1999); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Catholic
Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
27. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld, 2004 WL 2698052 (3d Cir. 2004).
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made by these neolibertarian scholars. These arguments are modified versions of
some old, widely discredited libertarian objections to antidiscrimination laws. The
neolibertarian move is to deploy the same old arguments, but to restrict their scope to
apply only to noncommercial associations. The challenge for the neolibertarians is to
show that this modification rescues the arguments from the fatal flaws of their predecessors.
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Roberts first gave the commercial/noncommercial distinction prominence. O’Connor thought that “an association
engaged exclusively in protected expression enjoys First Amendment protection of
both the content of its message and the choice of its members,” while “there is only
minimal constitutional protection of the freedom of commercial association.”28
O’Connor would characterize an association as commercial “when, and only when,
the association’s activities are not predominantly of the type protected by the First
Amendment.”29 She used the Boy Scouts as an example of the importance of context:
“Even the training of outdoor survival skills or participation in community service
might become expressive when the activity is intended to develop good morals, reverence, patriotism, and a desire for self-improvement.”30
The Dale Court does not state O’Connor’s limiting principle in its opinion, but she
provided the majority’s fifth vote and there is no reason to think that she has changed
her mind since Roberts.31 On the other hand, the Court’s opinion stressed the expressive (rather than the noncommercial) nature of the Scouts. Daniel Farber observes
that “the commercial or noncommercial character of an enterprise is only a rough
proxy for its expressive nature.”32 O’Connor did not write separately in Dale, and it
would be premature to conclude that the commercial/noncommercial distinction made
in her Roberts concurrence of sixteen years earlier—a distinction which is not even
mentioned in the Dale opinion—is now the law of the land.33
Nonetheless, should it be?

28. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 at 633-34 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
29. Id. at 635.
30. Id. at 636.
31. David Bernstein, Antidiscrimination Laws and the First Amendment, 66 MO. L. REV. 83, 127 (2001).
During the oral argument in Dale, Justice O’Connor asked whether the case might be resolved by relying on the
commercial/noncommercial distinction. Respondent’s Oral Argument at 23, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, No.
99-699, 2000 WL 489419, at *23 (Apr. 26, 2000).
32. Daniel A. Farber, Speaking in the First Person Plural: Expressive Associations and the First Amendment, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1483, 1500 (2001). Justice O’Connor has written that a commercial association is not
protected even if it engages in expressive activity. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 639 (O’Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment); New York State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 20 (1988)
(O’Connor, J., joined by Kennedy, J., concurring).
33. But see Bernstein, supra note 31, at 126-27; David Bernstein, The Right of Expressive Association and
Private Universities’ Racial Preferences and Speech Codes, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 619, 626 (2001).
Bernstein is more cautious about the meaning of Dale in DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, YOU CAN’T SAY THAT! THE
GROWING THREAT TO CIVIL LIBERTIES FROM ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS 104 (2003).
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A. The Paleolibertarian Critique
The libertarian objection to antidiscrimination laws is quite old. Classic libertariannism—call it “paleolibertarianism” to distinguish it from the neolibertarianism
of the contemporary writers whom this paper addresses—takes two forms: deontological and consequentialist. These rest on three argumentative strategies, which I
will call “Rights,” “Optimism,” and “Distrust.”
The Rights argument resembles Kantian deontology in that it insists on economic
rights without depending on predictions about the workings of an unregulated economy.34 The argument claims that laws against discrimination are unjust regardless of
what the consequences of discrimination might be. It begins with the premise that law
should not interfere with liberty except to prevent violations of rights. Interferences
for any reason other than the prevention of rights violations are themselves rights violations. When A associates with B, but refuses to associate with C, that association
does not violate any rights of C. No one has a right to compel others to associate with
her. Therefore, A has a right not to associate with C. It follows that the law violates
A’s rights when it penalizes A for her refusal to associate with C. When a state violates people’s rights, it fails to show them the respect to which they are entitled.35
Many opponents of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, notably presidential candidate Barry
Goldwater, made arguments of this sort.36
Theories of this kind are familiar in the liberal tradition, but they rest on a dubiously atomistic conception of human life, with a remarkably constricted account of the
human interests that the state can legitimately protect.37 A society could, on this account, have a permanent outcast population in a state of chronic economic misery,
vulnerable to ruthless exploitation.38 The state would have no power to remedy this,
even if the culture of prejudice that is maintained thereby is one that itself produces
numerous rights violations.39 It is bizarre to think that respect for persons demands
such person-destroying results. Not only does this account fetishize a historically contingent distribution of entitlements; it also misreads the history it fetishizes. The idea
that property entails an absolute right to discriminate is not embedded in the common
law from time immemorial but is an artifact of the Jim Crow era.40 Kant, who is the
wellspring of such rights-based arguments, was not himself so indifferent to consid-

34. The linkage is clearest in ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
35. For arguments of this sort, see AYN RAND, THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS: A NEW CONCEPT OF
EGOISM 126-34 (1964); Michael Levin, Negative Liberty, 2 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 84, 98-100 (1984). George
Kateb approaches the position described in the text but shrinks from it without much explanation, conceding that
businesses, at least, may legitimately be denied the right to discriminate. George Kateb, The Value of Association,
in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 35, 58 (Amy Gutmann ed. 1998).
36. See RICK PERLSTEIN, BEFORE THE STORM: BARRY GOLDWATER AND THE UNMAKING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSENSUS 363-64 (2001), id. at 462 (quoting Goldwater’s speech, co-authored by William
Rehnquist, declaring that “the freedom to associate means the same thing as the freedom not to associate”).
37. See Charles Taylor, Atomism, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 2,
187 (1985).
38. See THOMAS W. POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS 15-62 (1989).
39. See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 43-47, 181-90 (1996).
40. Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW.
U. L. REV. 1283, 1475 (1996).
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erations of human welfare.41 As a constitutional argument, libertarianism also has the
handicap of entailing the correctness of Lochner v. New York,42 case law that only a
few academics are bold enough to want to resuscitate.
Another strand of libertarian thought does attend to consequences. It rests on two
interdependent claims: (1) Government is not to be trusted (Distrust), and (2) an unregulated capitalist economy produces good results (Optimism).43 These claims are
interdependent because the strength of each depends on that of the other. Even a
largely self-regulating economy might usefully be tinkered with by a sufficiently wise
and trustworthy government. Conversely, if an unregulated economy leads to disaster,
even an incompetent and corrupt regulator may be better than no regulator at all.
Both claims are exaggerated. The idea that capitalist economies can regulate
themselves may have been plausible in John Locke’s time, but it is hardly so today.44
Unregulated markets do not distribute goods in a just way.45 Their capacity to satisfy
people’s preferences is routinely hamstrung by monopolies, externalities, and other
transaction costs. They also produce aggregate effects that no one wants, such as vicious cycles of boom and bust. That is why libertarianism has been such a flop. No
unregulated economy exists in any modern industrial country. And government has
not proven to be all that untrustworthy. After the judiciary stopped reading libertarianism into the Constitution in the 1930s, the American economy did not collapse, but
instead relied on its economic output to win World War II and the Cold War. Central
management of the money supply has produced a marked softening of the business
cycle. Libertarians worry about regulators being captured by powerful interests, but
much of modern regulation manages to pursue the public interest.46 The classic tales
of wasteful overregulation that are repeatedly cited in the media have been proven
apocryphal.47 As a general matter, Optimism and Distrust are both falsified by experience.
They meet the same fate when they are applied to antidiscrimination law. Richard
Epstein has argued that consumer welfare would be maximized if a right to discriminate were allowed.48 Epstein’s optimism about the fate of minorities in unrestricted
markets is supported neither by history nor by economic theory.49 And, once more,
41. See ALLEN D. ROSEN, KANT’S THEORY OF JUSTICE 173-208 (1993). Nozick, the most prominent exponent of this type of libertarianism, eventually recanted. See ROBERT NOZICK, THE EXAMINED LIFE 286-96
(1989).
42. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
43. Both claims are prominent in, for example, FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944);
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY, V. 2: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (1976).
44. See IAN SHAPIRO, THE EVOLUTION OF RIGHTS IN LIBERAL THEORY 80-203 (1986).
45. The classic argument is JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
46. Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7 (2000).
47. See Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE. L.J. 1981 (1998).
48. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAWS (1992). That his basic philosophical orientation is utilitarian rather than rights-based is made clear in
Richard Epstein, Standing Firm, on Forbidden Grounds, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (1994).
49. See Glenn C. Loury, Why Should We Care About Group Inequality?, 5 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 249, 25359 (1987), David Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L. J. 1619 (1991), Cass R. Sunstein, Why Markets Don’t Stop Discrimination, 8
SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 22 (Spr. 1991). The weaknesses of Epstein’s attack on antidiscrimination laws are can-
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the premise of Distrust is called into question by the success of antidiscrimination
laws in dismantling discriminatory markets and opening economic opportunities to
African-American citizens.
There is, of course, a valid core to libertarianism. Markets generate wealth better
than any rival economic arrangement. They are distributively just to the extent that
they make the availability of resources to any person depend on the value of those resources to others.50 Also, they necessarily preclude some kinds of centralized direction: “Freedom means that in some measure we entrust our fate to forces which we do
not control. . . .”51 But these generalizations have important exceptions. There is a big
difference between being right most of the time and being right all of the time.
B. The Neolibertarian Modification
Neolibertarianism is a mutated form of a perennial type of conservative constitutionalism, one which holds that government ought not to intervene in the private sector, either because to do so violates citizens’ rights, or because government cannot be
trusted with such powers, or because the unregulated private sector is already the best
of all possible worlds.
The newest arguments for a right against antidiscrimination law modify the older
libertarian view, which had no use for the commercial/noncommercial distinction, but
continue to rely on some combination of Rights, Optimism, and Distrust.
1. Rights
The strongest Rights-based claims after Dale are those developed by Michael
Stokes Paulsen. He contends that the freedom of speech should be understood to include all exercises of freedom of association. The First Amendment’s text “does not
limit the freedom to those who speak alone,”52 and so must include the right of groups
to choose the content of their messages.
That logically entails a freedom of autonomous message formation and delivery by the group,
including the right of the group to define itself—to define who will constitute the group that
forms the message and the speakers who will express it on behalf of the group—and, finally,
to exclude competing messages from being intermingled with the group’s chosen expres53
sion.

These activities are not themselves speech, but they are a necessary part of the process
that produces speech, and so Paulsen infers that they should also be protected from

vassed in detail in a symposium at 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1-277 (1994), and in Samuel Issacharoff, Contractual
Liberties in Discriminatory Markets, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1219 (1992) (review of Forbidden Grounds).
50. RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 65 (2000).
51. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY, supra note 43, at 30.
52. Paulsen, supra note 9, at 1922. For this he cites Akhil Amar’s historical work on the speech and assembly clauses, but Amar’s scholarship does not help him. The right of the people to assemble, Amar observes,
“referred to formal gatherings of voters—who else could presume to instruct lawmakers?—rather than mere
informal clumps of self-selected persons seeking to associate.” AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 29 (1998). It has no obvious implications for the freedom of nonpolitical
groups to discriminate.
53. Paulsen, supra note 9, at 1922.
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state interference.54 Government’s incompetence to regulate speech evidently entails
its incompetence to regulate the precursors of speech, such as association.
Paulsen is skeptical of the diminished protection accorded to commercial speech,55
and he thinks the distinction particularly problematic in the expressive association
cases: “Expressive associations can have substantial commercial aspects. . . . Conversely, commercial business enterprises can have substantial expressive dimensions. . . .”56 Because Paulsen’s approach is so abstract, it offers little to anchor the
commercial/noncommercial distinction. He concedes that the distinction may have
value because it “supplies an important, if imperfect, limiting principle that attempts
to cabin government’s efforts to limit the freedom of expressive association.”57 But
this implies that nothing of value would be lost if government’s power to regulate associations were not “cabined” to commercial associations but eliminated altogether.
Paulsen’s argument might be understood to apply only to precursors of speech that
are clearly tied to the production of a specific message. But that would just give us
the message-based approach of Roberts again, and Paulsen has bigger fish to fry. If
the thesis is not thus confined, it would entail the unconstitutionality of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which affected the precursors of speech by disrupting racist institutions and condemning racism as morally wrong.58 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 appears to have played a powerful role in changing racist social norms.59 Antidiscrimination law is not intelligible except as an effort to change such norms.60
The trouble doesn’t stop with the Civil Rights Act. All human conduct is a precursor of speech. All government regulation affects the culture. Thus, Paulsen’s theory entails the correctness of Lochner as well. Maximum hours laws affect attitudes
toward both work and economic policy and thus have political consequences. In that
respect, such laws determine the speech that will occur. This reasoning is anarchic in
its implications.61 If government cannot be trusted to regulate any of the precursors of
political criticism, then government cannot be trusted to regulate anything.62

54. For a similar argument, see Carpenter, supra note 2 at 1535-36 n.99.
55. Paulsen, supra note 9, at 1924.
56. Id. at 1927 n.49.
57. Id.
58. Elsewhere Paulsen acknowledges that “[f]ew these days would take seriously an employer’s argument
that racially discriminatory employment practices are protected as ‘free speech’.” Michael Stokes Paulsen, A
Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Limited Public Forum: Unconstitutional Conditions on “Equal Access” for Religious Speakers and Groups, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 675-766 (1996).
59. See Richard McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and
Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1074-82 (1995).
60. ROBERT POST, ET AL., PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN ANTIDISCRIMINATION
LAW (2001); KOPPELMAN, supra note 39.
61. The potentially anarchic implication of a very broad reading of the First Amendment was noted long
ago by Robert Bork. See Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L. J.
1, 25-27 (1971). I am not entirely confident of my interpretation of Paulsen, because in a few footnotes, he
nearly takes it all back by suggesting that the appropriate test for a restriction on associational freedom is that of
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)—a test that in practice has been even easier for the state to satisfy than the Roberts test. See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000). See Paulsen, supra note
58, at 692-93 n.93; Paulsen, supra note 9, at 1936 n.86. (On the Dale Court’s unpersuasive efforts to distinguish O’Brien, see Stephen Clark, Judicially Straight? Boy Scouts v. Dale and the Missing Scalia Dissent, 76
S. CAL. L. REV. 521, 571-73 (2003).) If this is Paulsen’s view, then he should not be classed as one of the neo-
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A similarly broad reading of the First Amendment is implicit in the Dale opinion,
as Richard Epstein has noted.63 Building on the Court’s holding that an association
need only engage in expression in order to be protected, he observes that businesses
are constantly engaged in expressive activity, and so the logic of Dale applies to them
as well as to noneconomic entities.64
The problem will be present in any Rights-based approach to freedom of association that tries somehow to derive it from the abstract idea of freedom itself: The resulting theory will be so abstract that there will be no traction to support the economic/noneconomic distinction, and so it will always collapse back into
paleolibertarianism. The only hope for maintaining the neolibertarian position, then,
is some kind of consequentialist argument. And, indeed, the most persuasive of the
neolibertarians rely on some combination of Distrust and Optimism.
Dale Carpenter’s theory of associational freedom is driven largely by Distrust. He
thoroughly catalogues the dangers of Roberts’s message-based approach, which requires courts to scrutinize a group’s message to determine whether that message is
impaired by the application of an antidiscrimination law. Such an approach, he argues, is likely to systematically punish unpopular opinions, since any doubt about a
group’s message will probably be resolved against such opinions.65 The messagebased approach underestimates the expressiveness of membership policies.66 It fails to
notice that silence can itself be a kind of speech, as it was in the case of the Scouts.67
It also fails to note the practical harm to an organization that can be brought about by
compliance with an antidiscrimination law.68
All the dangers that Carpenter enumerates are indeed presented by a messagebased approach. On the other hand, the specific abuses that he worries about have not
often manifested themselves.69 He worries that these dangers are particularly problibertarians; but then it would be hard to understand how he can support the result in Dale, as he obviously
does.
62. Frederick Schauer has made an analogous point:
To distrust a decisionmaker is to adopt, usually sub silentio, a comparatively rosy view of the status
quo. If one has a relatively positive view about where we are now, then one does not want to create
new powers possibly producing significant negative changes. Conversely, however, if one is not
thrilled with where we are now, a significant possibility that things could get better might be worth
running a significant risk that things could get worse. After all, from some points of view, how much
worse could they get? Stated another way, the view that process values are sufficiently important to
justify tolerating some substantively suboptimal results is a view that presupposes that the process has
served us moderately well.
The Calculus of Distrust, 77 VA. L. REV. 653, 666 (1991). I have cited this passage in the past with some skepticism, see Koppelman, supra note 39, at 261, but there I was discussing content-based restrictions on speech,
restrictions with a long history of abuse. There is no such history here.
63. See Richard Epstein, The Constitutional Perils of Moderation: The Case of the Boy Scouts, 74 S. CAL.
L. REV. 119, 139-40 (2000). Epstein concedes, however, that it would be “bold and foolhardy” to claim that
current law goes so far. Id. at 139.
64. See Id.
65. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 1517.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1542.
68. See id. 1542-63.
69. Carpenter does devote a long discussion to the history of state-sponsored suppression of expressive
associations, id. at 1520-33, but all of the history he describes involves naked viewpoint discrimination, which
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lematic for gay organizations, but he offers no historical instance in which the message-based approach was used to such an organization’s detriment.70
Carpenter offers the commercial/noncommercial distinction as a “compromise”71
solution that avoids these dangers. He observes that “holding a job is more important
to most people than learning morals from a scoutmaster while tying a knot in front of
a campfire.”72 Economic interests, protected by the application of antidiscrimination
laws to employers and retail businesses, are indeed more important than the noneconomic interests that would be served by the application of those laws to noncommercial associations. But it does not follow that noneconomic interests are not important. This compromise might sensibly be adopted by a legislature. Indeed, it has been
adopted by most state legislatures. But it does not follow that those who reject this
compromise are violating the Constitution.
The same theme of distrust is clear in Richard Epstein’s critique of a messagebased approach, though he carries it to a different conclusion than Carpenter. The
Scouts’ policy of quietly discriminating against gays made it hard for them to establish their message in court, Epstein observes, but it is “the kind of studied compromise
that a large and successful organization must make to stave off schism or disintegration.”73 The compromise is “more stable in practice than coherent in theory,”74 but if
greater clarity is a prerequisite for protection, then “[t]he obvious incentive is for organizations to take extreme positions in order to avoid the heavy hand of state regulation.”75 A similar concern is intimated in the Dale opinion: “The fact that the organization does not trumpet its views from the housetops . . . does not mean that its views
receive no First Amendment protection.”76 This is a serious objection. I shall defer
consideration of it until after examining the pertinent state interests.77

therefore would be unconstitutional even without any special doctrine protecting associational rights.
Carpenter responds by noting the courts’ hamhanded treatment of the groups’ messages in Roberts and (in
the lower courts) Dale. “Even if there aren’t many examples yet I’m not sure this response is fair given that
application of antidiscrimination laws to private, expressive organizations is itself a very recent development
(perhaps the last two decades). Give it time, I predict, and the abuses would multiply.” Personal communication, Oct. 19, 2003. But there is no such trend. Most antidiscrimination laws have not been construed to apply
to private nonexpressive organizations. Even the New Jersey case is an outlier and might have been overruled
by the legislature had the Court not intervened.
70. “Imagine, for example, putting the fate of a gay organization’s internal organizational rules in the
hands of an elected judge in a state with an anti-gay sodomy law.” Id. at 1549. The prospect is scary, but it is
noteworthy that it hasn’t happened yet. There is a history of pervasive viewpoint-based discrimination against
gays, see Andrew Koppelman, Why Gay Legal History Matters, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2035 (2000) (reviewing
WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET (1999)), but it considerably antedates Roberts.
71. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 1587.
72. Id. at 1585-86.
73. Epstein, supra note 63, at 128.
74. Id. at 129.
75. Id. at 131. For similar arguments, see Carpenter, supra note 2, at 1547; Reply Brief for Petitioner at 4,
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, No. 99-699, 2000 WL 432367 (Apr. 04, 2000).
76. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000).
77. See infra part V.
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2. Optimism and Distrust
We already noticed that the Optimism and Distrust arguments are interdependent.
Even clumsy government intervention will be justified if the consequences of an unregulated market are worse. Thus, it is not surprising that the Scouts’ own attorney
relied primarily on Optimism to make his case.
The Optimism strategy is stressed by Professor (now Judge) Michael McConnell,
who argued the case for the Scouts in Dale. McConnell’s brief claimed that private,
noncommercial expressive associations have a right to choose their own members and
an unqualified right to choose their leaders.78 He has expanded on the justification for
this rule in his writings unrelated to the litigation:
If every group is internally diverse and pluralistic, reflecting the population as a whole, every
group will be the same. If groups are required to accept members and appoint leaders who do
not share their distinctive beliefs, their distinctive voice will be silenced. If individuals with
disfavored beliefs can be forced to participate in institutions designed to mold them in accordance with the dictates of political correctness, the tapestry of pluralism will be seriously impaired. Genuine pluralism requires group difference, and maintenance of group difference requires that groups have the freedom to exclude, as well as the freedom to dissent. Freedom of
79
association is an essential structural principle in a liberal society.

What McConnell describes would indeed be a nightmare, but is it a real danger?
Even New Jersey, when it applied its antidiscrimination laws to the Scouts, did not say
that there could be no discrimination anywhere in the state, but only that the Scouts
were large and unselective enough to be a public accommodation. McConnell’s objection is like an argument against economic regulation that thunders about the evils
of Leninism. This distrust is coupled with the optimistic assumption that in an unregulated society, associations will conform to the maximum possible extent to the beliefs of citizens.
The resemblance between McConnell’s argument and old arguments for laissezfaire economics is clearest in an early article he coauthored with Judge Richard Posner. The McConnell-Posner vision is one of “a constitutionally prescribed free market
for religious belief.”80 Just as an economist assumes that absent distortions of competition, such as externalities, an unregulated market will allocate resources efficiently,
so the theorist of religious freedom should assume that competition between religions
is valuable.
The use of a free-market bench-mark is important because it identifies ways in which government policy distorts (sometimes unintentionally) the pattern of economic activity, causing
resources to flow from higher-valued to lower-valued uses. Similarly, the First Amendment
can be understood as positing that the “market”—the realm of private choice—will reach the
“best” religious results; or, more accurately, that the government has no authority to alter
81
such results.

78. Brief for Petitioner at 32, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, No. 99-699, 2000 WL 228616. (Feb. 28, 2000).
79. Michael W. McConnell, The New Establishmentarianism, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 453, 466 (2000).
80. Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 60 (1989).
81. Id. at 14.
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Government should be neutral toward religion in that it should “create neither incentives nor disincentives to engage in religious activities.”82
McConnell’s argument for freedom of association closely resembles his argument
for freedom of religion. In both cases, the analogy with the market is doing a lot of
work. His Dale brief argues that “controversial questions of personal morality, often
involving religious conviction, are best tested and resolved within the private marketplace of ideas, and not as the subject of government-imposed orthodoxy.”83
In his leading article on the religion clauses, McConnell proposes to read the First
Amendment to “protect against government-induced uniformity in matters of religion.”84 The baseline for the question whether government is inhibiting or inducing religious practice, McConnell argues, should be “the hypothetical world in which individuals make decisions about religion on the basis of their own religious conscience,
without the influence of government.”85 But this hypothetical world not only does not
exist—it cannot be imagined. Religious choices are always already made in a political
context.86 In a world in which Christians are not permitted by the state to massacre
Jews, it is inevitable that the meaning of Christianity will gradually shift, so that
Christians no longer think that massacres of Jews are pleasing to God. Legislation by
its nature induces uniformity. If government must play no role in the shaping of religion, then courts must invalidate the homicide statutes, which impair the formation and
preservation of religions (such as that of the Aztecs) that value homicide. Any action
at all by government will have some effect on religion, so, absent anarchy, a world in
which there is no effect whatsoever is neither attainable nor desirable.
McConnell and Posner acknowledge this.87 The interpretation of neutrality that
they advocate is one in which “effects of government action on religious practice must
be minimized, and can be justified only on the basis of demonstrable and unavoidable
relation to a public purpose unrelated to the religious effect.”88 Prevention of negative
externalities would always satisfy this test; provision of public goods might or might
not, depending on the weights of the burden on the minority and of the relative impairment of the good; paternalism and enforcement of morality should never pass the
test.89 Unlike McConnell’s approach to freedom of association, there is no talk of absolute rights in this co-written work.
To the extent this argument is persuasive, it is because a quasi-libertarian argument works unusually well in the area of religion. Many people believe that there is a
fundamental right to follow one’s religious convictions; there is ample evidence that
government is incompetent to discern religious truth; and there is also much evidence

82. Id. at 11.
83. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 78, at 47.
84. Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 194 (1992).
85. Id. at 169.
86. This argument was previously made more briefly in Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L.
REV. 87, 152 (2002), and is defended against objections in Andrew Koppelman, No Expressly Religious Orthodoxy: A Response to Steven D. Smith, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 729 (2003).
87. See McConnell and Posner, supra note 80, at 6-7.
88. Id. at 33.
89. Id. at 46-51.
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that religion thrives under a nonestablishment rule.90 The Distrust consideration is
particularly powerful here. James Madison famously denounced the idea “that the
Civil Magistrate is a competent Judge of Religious truth” as “an arrogant pretension
falsified by the contradictory opinions of Rulers in all ages. . . .”91 But this incompetence does not extend to all possible matters of cultural formation.
One of the most powerful recent defenses of an absolute freedom of noncommercial association is Nancy Rosenblum’s book, Membership and Morals.92 Rosenblum
shows that even the most discriminatory and illiberal associations do not invariably
damage liberal citizenship. For the alienated loners who join such associations, the
likely alternative to illiberal participation is not liberal participation, but even more
antisocial behaviors such as crime and drug addiction. Membership in illiberal groups
may also strengthen some virtues of citizenship, such as hard work, economic selfsufficiency, and cooperation. Some memberships are also temporary and limited, and
they coexist with other identities and memberships.
Rosenblum’s evidence destroys the mechanistic assumption that liberal society is
undermined by all illiberal prejudices and associations within it. But to refute this
claim is not to establish the opposite proposition, that such prejudices and associations
never have antiliberal consequences severe enough to warrant legislative intervention.
Epstein’s claim that competition among groups will provide a satisfactory remedy for
any pattern of exclusion, Rosenblum thinks, “applies much more convincingly to voluntary associations than it does to employment.”93 In order to determine that, however, one would need to examine the evidence in favor of intervention in any particular case in order to determine both the benefit achieved thereby and the burden on
association.
A similar combination of Optimism and Distrust appears in John McGinnis’s defense of Dale. McGinnis thinks that Dale instantiates a general theme in the
Rehnquist Court’s jurisprudence of promoting “decentralization and the private ordering of social norms.”94 The rule of Dale, he argues, prevents totalitarian domination
of government over culture. The abandonment of a message-based approach “allows
private associations to exert subtle social pressures through relatively quiet judgments.”95 Requiring a clear link between message and protection would create a
world “where contentious political advocacy alone supplements the norms encouraged
by the government.”96 And, once again, the market will fix any wrong that is done.
“BSA’s policy decisions are subject to a self-correcting mechanism because they put
90. See Koppelman, Secular Purpose, supra note 86, at 110.
91. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in RELIGION AND THE
CONSTITUTION 65 (Michael W. McConnell et al., eds., 2002).
92. NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS: THE PERSONAL USES OF PLURALISM IN
AMERICA (1998).
93. Id. at 170.
94. John O. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence of Social
Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485, 489 (2002). For a critique of McGinnis’s defense of the Rehnquist Court’s
work, see Andrew Koppelman, How “Decentralization” Rationalizes Oligarchy: John McGinnis and the
Rehnquist Court, 20 CONST. COMMENT 11 (2003).
95. McGinnis, supra note 94, at 533.
96. Id. at 534.
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the organization at risk of losing members and civic respect.”97 This is often true of
noneconomic associations, and it is also often true of economic associations. Like
Epstein and Paulsen, McGinnis thinks that the economic/noneconomic distinction may
prove “unstable,”98 since so much of business is expressive. It is hard to keep the
logic of the argument from reaching the Civil Rights Act. Since the neolibertarian argument rests on an analogy between associations and markets, it is no surprise that the
argument applies as well to markets as it does to associations.99
Like the arguments for laissez-faire economic policy, the Optimism argument for
freedom of association overgeneralizes from what is often the case to a claim about
what is always the case. Regulation of markets is indeed unnecessary and counterproductive. Except sometimes. The neolibertarians claim that the “sometimes” does not
happen all that often, but this is merely a hunch. It is dangerous for such hunches to
become the basis of judge-made law, particularly constitutional law that is immune to
legislative reconsideration in light of experience.100
Let us take a closer look at the “sometimes.”
IV
THE STATE INTEREST
Why would the state ever want to regulate the membership policies of noncommercial associations? As William Marshall observes, “[t]he definitional questions of
where a liberty interest begins and a state interest ends are often interrelated.”101 The
Supreme Court’s opinion in Dale declares that “[t]he state interests embodied in New
Jersey’s public accommodations law do not justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy
Scouts’ rights to freedom of expressive association,”102 but, remarkably, it never says
what these interests are. The Boy Scouts question presents a useful case study of the
relevant interests and therefore of the costs of a broad judicial protection of associations’ right to exclude. Perhaps the costs are worth it. But one cannot tell unless one
knows what those costs are.
Dale is the focus of this article because it was the case that provided the Court the
strongest justification for an expanded freedom of association. Indeed, given the uncertainty of the opinion’s reach, perhaps all one can say with confidence about Dale is
that the Court felt certain that the Scouts, at least, were entitled to expanded protection. If the Court’s intuition turns out to be wrong, then the case for expanding the
freedom of association into an absolute protection for noncommercial associations becomes weak indeed.
97. Id. at 535.
98. Id. at 538 n.268.
99. A similar defense of a broad freedom of association is offered in BERNSTEIN, supra note 33, at 97-110.
Bernstein relies on McGinnis’s claims, see id. at 103, but is even vaguer than McGinnis about the precise scope
of the freedom of association that he wants to defend.
100. See Ronald J. Allen, Constitutional Adjudication, the Demands of Knowledge, and Epistemological
Modesty, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 436 (1993).
101. William P. Marshall, Discrimination and the Right of Association, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 68, 96 n.166
(1986).
102. 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000).
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There are two reasons for thinking that it was a mistake to extend such categorical
protection to the Scouts. First, even if the Scouts’ discrimination accurately reflects
the preferences of its members, it nonetheless inflicts considerable harm on a large
population of vulnerable children whose preferences are not adequately taken into account by the market for association. Second, there is some reason to doubt whether
the Scouts’ discriminatory policy really does reflect members’ preferences better than
a regime in which states can prevent discrimination by the Scouts within their borders.
A. Externalities and Distributive Injustices
The clearest benefit of legal intervention against discrimination is that it will prevent harm to the specific persons who are discriminated against. The harm prevented
may outweigh the harm caused by regulation to the person who is prevented from discriminating. The balance of harms is not determinable by a universal rule in either the
economic or the noneconomic sphere.103 Discrimination has cultural as well as economic externalities: a practice of exclusion that makes insiders very happy may nonetheless injure those who are made pariahs, both because outcast status is bad in itself
and because such status is likely to lead to the violation of other rights.104
As I noted earlier, unregulated markets often produce unjust distributions. Economics is notoriously indeterminate with respect to initial entitlements. If these are
unjust, then a free market will simply perpetuate the injustice: garbage in, garbage out.
The same is true of unjustly stigmatized social status. Absent the intervention of the
civil rights legislation of the 1960s, America’s racism would almost certainly be
worse than it is now. In changing our culture, we have become a more just society.
The fairness of the distribution of honor and dishonor matters, too.105
In the Boy Scouts case, the most relevant externalities and distributive injustices
concern gay children. They were the group who most obviously would have benefited
from the application of an antidiscrimination statute to the Scouts.
The stigma against gay people in the United States is most profound among adolescents. A study of harassment in American high schools found that the most upsetting type of harassment was being called gay.106 One national survey of males aged
15-19 found that 89% thought that the idea of homosexual sexual activity was “disgusting,” and only 12% were sure that they could befriend an openly gay male.107
Students are often conspicuously cruel to peers whom they perceive as gay. Students
103. See Peter DeMarneffe, Rights, Reasons, and Freedom of Association, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
145 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998).
104. See generally Koppelman, supra note 39; Andrew Koppelman, On the Moral Foundations of Legal
Expressivism, 60 MD. L. REV. 777 (2001).
105. See Will Kymlicka, Civil Society and Government: A Liberal-Egalitarian Perspective, in CIVIL
SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT 79 (Nancy L. Rosenblum and Robert C. Post eds., 2002).
106. Alice McKee, American Association of University Women, Hostile Hallways: The AAUW Survey on
Sexual Harassment in America’s Schools 20, 23 (1993). See also Deborah Brake, The Cruelest of the Gender
Police: Student-to-Student Sexual Harassment and Anti-Gay Peer Harassment Under Title IX, 1 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 37 (1999).
107. William Marsiglio, Attitudes toward Homosexual Activity and Gays as Friends: A National Survey of
Heterosexual 15- to 19-Year-Old Males, 30 J. SEX RES. 12 (1993).
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thought to be gay are often publicly humiliated, threatened with harm, spit at, pushed,
and physically attacked. Adults in authority often do nothing at all about the harassment, and sometimes they blame the victims.108
Gay adolescents often are rejected, not only by their peers, but by their parents as
well.109 This extreme rejection and isolation produces a disproportionately high incidence of suicide attempts.110 One study found that suicide attempts were associated
with “reliance on social support from people who rejected them because of their sexual orientation . . . .”111 Gay youth have the option of keeping their sexuality secret
from everyone, but this secrecy has psychic costs of its own. The fear of discovery
becomes an integral part of their lives, and the constant feeling of isolation often leads
to clinical depression.112 Suicide attempts “occur[ ] most often before they acknowledged or disclosed their sexual identities to others.”113
Those prejudiced against gays regard them as, in some ways, even more polluting
than racists regarded blacks. Gays are traditionally entitled to no legitimized place at
all in society.114 Martha Nussbaum observes that in the judge’s famous speech at
Oscar Wilde’s sentencing for sodomy, one of the most prominent legal texts in the
history of homosexuality, the judge “treats the prisoners as objects of disgust, vile
contaminants who are not really people, and who therefore need not be addressed as if
they were people.”115 From this it is not far to Heinrich Himmler’s speech to his SS
generals, in which he explained that the medieval German practice of drowning gay
men in bogs “was no punishment, merely the extermination of an abnormal life. It
had to be removed just as we [now] pull up stinging nettles, toss them on a heap, and

108. See Safe Schools Coalition of Washington State, They Don’t Even Know Me! Understanding Anti-Gay
Harassment and Violence in the Schools (1999), at http://www.safeschools-wa.org/theydontevenknowme.pdf.
See also Gay, Lesbian, and Straight Educational Network, The 2003 National School Climate Survey,
http://www.glsen.org/cgi-bin/iowa/all/news/record/1413.html; Human Rights Watch, Hatred in the Hallways:
Discrimination and Violence Against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Students in U.S. Public Schools,
at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/uslgbt/; Pride and Prejudice: Working With Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual
Youth (Margaret Schneider ed., 1997).
109. Anthony R. D’Augelli, Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Development During Adolescence and Young
Adulthood, in Textbook of Homosexuality and Mental Health 267, 275 (Robert P. Cabaj and Terry S. Stein
eds., 1996).
110. One well-known study found that “gay youth are 2 to 3 times more likely to attempt suicide than other
young people. They may comprise up to 30 percent of completed youth suicides annually.” Paul Gibson, Gay
Male and Lesbian Youth Suicide, in 3 Report of the Secretary’s Task Force on Youth Suicide, U.S. Dept. of
Health and Human Services 3-110 (1989). Some recent studies have confirmed this finding, while others suggest that the disparity exists but is far lower. See Ritch C. Savin-Williams, Suicide Attempts Among SexualMinority Youths: Population and Measurement Issues, 69 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCH. 983 (2001).
111. D’Augelli, supra note 109, at 280.
112. See A. Damien Martin & Emery S. Hetrick, The Stigmatization of the Gay and Lesbian Adolescent, 15
J. HOMOSEXUALITY 163 (1988). “These youth suffer from chronic depression and are at high risk of attempting suicide when the pressure becomes too much to bear. They may run away from home with no one understanding why. A suicidal crisis may be precipitated by a minor event which serves as a ‘last straw’ to the youth.
A low grade may confirm for the youth that life is a failure. An unwitting homophobic remark by parents may
be taken to mean that the youth is no longer loved by them.” Gibson, supra note 110, at 3-120.
113. D’Augelli, supra note 109, at 280.
114. See Cheshire Calhoun, Sexuality Injustice, 9 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 241 (1995).
115. Martha C. Nussbaum, “Secret Sewers of Vice”: Disgust, Bodies, and the Law, in THE PASSIONS OF
LAW 46 (Susan A. Bandes ed. 1999).
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burn them.”116 Such attitudes are a ubiquitous part of the experience of many gay
people in the contemporary United States, taking forms that range from cold attitudes
to violent attacks.117
If the state is going to combat this prejudice, it cannot be unconcerned with the institutions that promulgate it. Nan Hunter observes that when entities that generate
norms represent themselves as open to the public, but then exclude some people on
the basis of their identity, that exclusion becomes a marker of inferiority.118 Some of
those entities in fact have enormous norm-generating power, and those norms powerfully stigmatize those who are excluded.119
The Boy Scouts of America is now the single largest entity in the United States
that excludes gay people on the basis of their identity, and it justifies this exclusion on
the basis of gays’ own purported moral failings.120 It is a statistical certainty that tens
of thousands of the boys in the Scouts will grow up to be gay.121 We have already reviewed the devastating consequences when gay youth are forced to lie and hide their
identities, which is precisely what the Scouts’ policy requires of the gay adolescents
who discover their sexuality when they are already members. Defenders of the Scouts
emphasize the good that Scouting does and the valuable experiences and skills that
members acquire. But these very virtues can make the program poisonous for some.
The pressure on gay teenagers to hide their sexual identity, and the sense that their secret makes them intrinsically worthless, are more intense the more they already value
and trust the adults who, they discover, reject and ostracize gay people. After the
Rhode Island Medical Society unanimously approved a resolution saying that the
Scouts’ ban on gays would increase the risk of teen suicide, a spokesman for the
Scouts responded that gay youths had other options: “[T]here are other organizations
that these kids can be a member of.”122

116. Quoted in RICHARD MOHR, A MORE
FOR GAY RIGHTS 69 (1994).
117. See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY

PERFECT UNION: WHY STRAIGHT AMERICA MUST STAND UP

RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW 21-25
(2002).
118. Nan D. Hunter, Accommodating the Public Sphere: Beyond the Market Model, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1591,
1634 (2001).
119. See Marshall, supra note 101, at 94-96.
120. Even the United States military no longer does this. Rather, it justifies its policies on the basis of the
anticipated hostile reactions of non-gay troops to the presence of gay soldiers. See Andrew Koppelman, Gaze
in the Military: A Response to Professor Woodruff, 64 UMKC L. REV. 179 (1995). The Catholic Church condemns homosexual activity, but it does not hold that a person is morally defective and unclean merely because
of homosexual desire. Quite the contrary; “the particular inclination of the homosexual person is not a sin.”
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Letter to Bishops on the Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons
(Oct. 1, 1985), 32 THE POPE SPEAKS 62 (1987).
121. Between two and five percent of the male population is gay. See RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON
294-95 (1992). The 2000 Annual Report of the Boy Scouts of America reported a total membership of
3,351,969. Subsequent reports (reflecting, perhaps, negative publicity in the wake of Dale) do not state the total
membership. The 2001 Annual Report provides figures on Cub Scouts and Boy Scouts that add up to
3,049,070, while the 2002 report’s total is 3,011,269 and the 2003 report’s total is 2,911,823. See
http://www.scouting.org. It follows that the number of gay youth is somewhere between 60,000 and 152,000.
There is some evidence that the percentage is even higher among adolescents. See D’Augelli, supra note 109,
at 267-68.
122. Matthew Schuerman, Dying to Be a Boy Scout?: Doctors Say the Boy Scout Ban Will Increase The
Rate of Suicide Among Gay Youth, THE ADVOCATE, June 19, 2001, at 15.
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The trouble, of course, is that a seven-year-old boy does not know whether he is
gay when he decides to join the Cub Scouts. James Dale, whose expulsion from the
Scouts when he was a college student led to the Dale litigation, is an example. He
joined the organization when he was eight. He wanted to join when he was even
younger, since his older brother and his father were members.123 He was an enthusiastic Scout, rising to the rank of Eagle, the highest honor the Scouts could bestow.
The Scouts revoked Dale’s membership after a newspaper story, which did not
mention his affiliation with the Scouts, identified him as an officer of his college’s
lesbian and gay student organization. The Scouts claimed that Dale’s continued
membership would contradict their moral teachings because he disagreed with those
teachings. But the Scouts’ decision to terminate Dale was not, and could not have
been, based on his beliefs. When they threw him out, they did not know anything
about his beliefs.124 The Scouts also said that they believed that “homosexual conduct
is inconsistent with the requirement in the Scout Oath that a Scout be morally straight
and in the Scout Law that a Scout be clean in word and deed. . . .”125 But the Scouts
did not know anything about Dale’s conduct, either. They terminated him without
making any effort to find out about either his beliefs or his behavior.126 The letter that

123. Chuck Sudetic, The Struggle for the Soul of the Boy Scouts, ROLLING STONE, July 6-20, 2000, at 101,
105.
124. The relevant passage from the news article that was the basis of his expulsion reads:
James Dale, 19, co-president of the Rutgers University Lesbian Gay Alliance with Sharice Richardson, also 19, said he lived a double life while in high school, pretending to be straight while attending
a military academy.
He remembers dating girls and even laughing at homophobic jokes while at school, only admitting his homosexuality during his second year at Rutgers.
“I was looking for a role model, someone who was gay and accepting of me,” Dale said, adding
he wasn’t just seeking sexual experiences, but a community that would take him in and provide him
with a support network and friends.
Seminar Addresses Needs of Homosexual Teens, THE STAR LEDGER, July 8, 1990, quoted in Boy Scouts of Am.
v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 at 689-90 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125. Position statement promulgated by the Boy Scouts in 1991, quoted in Dale, 530 U.S. at 652 (majority
opinion).
126. The following representation during the Scouts’ oral argument in Dale thus is inconsistent with the
stipulated facts:
QUESTION: When you—I’m not sure what we’re talking about when we say exclusion of people
who are not openly homosexual. I mean, what if someone is homosexual in the sense of having a
sexual orientation in that direction but does not engage in any homosexual conduct?
MR. DAVIDSON: Well, if that person also were to take the view that the reason they didn’t engage
in that conduct would it would be morally wrong—
QUESTION: Right.
MR. DAVIDSON: —and that’s the view that would be communicated to youth, that case has not
come up, but it’s my understanding of the policy that that person would not be excluded.
QUESTION: But somebody who was homosexual and celibate, but who said, in my view it isn’t
morally wrong, would such a person be excluded?
MR. DAVIDSON: Justice Ginsburg, I’m not sure I got the nots right in that question, but if somebody said it was morally wrong, and that they didn’t engage in it but did have homosexual inclinations, I believe that that person would be eligible for leadership, as I understand the policy.
Official Transcript of Oral Argument at 6-7, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, April 26, 2000, 2000 WL 489419 (No.
99-699). “No BSA representatives spoke with Dale during the course of his expulsion, asked his views on
sexuality or any topic, or questioned his approach to scoutmaster duties.” Brief for Respondent at 7, Boy
Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (No. 99-699).
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told him the reason for his expulsion stated simply that the Boy Scouts “specifically
forbid membership to homosexuals.”127 They threw him out for being gay.
“Boy Scouts was community,” Dale later explained.128 “It was a place where I felt
I belonged. I did other things. I was in soccer and basketball. But nothing fit as well
as the Boy Scouts. I felt I didn’t have to be the best football player or run the fastest.
In the Boy Scouts, I could be who I was. They valued me for who I was.”129 When he
was expelled, “it was like a kidney punch. I felt betrayed. This was the organization
that taught me how to be me.”130
Possibly, these harms do not rise to the level that justifies interference with the
Scouts’ liberty. That was the position of most legislatures before Dale. The Scouts’
cultural power may not be enough to inflict serious harm on many boys. Competition
among youth groups and activities may ameliorate the harm of exclusion. But these
are fact-dependent questions, the answers to which are likely to vary from place to
place. They are not sensibly resolved by a uniform national rule emanating from the
courts. The prevention of this kind of mistreatment is not obviously beyond the legitimate power of the state.
B. The Free Market of Ideas and the Second Best
Thus far, this analysis has assumed that an unregulated market reflects the preferences of consumers; that if the Scouts exclude gays, it is because that is what the
members want. The Scouts, however, have considerable market power that is reinforced by the Boy Scouts’ status as a kind of government-created monopoly. Consequently it is far from clear that regulation must produce a decline in consumer satisfaction.131
The position in society of the Boy Scouts of America is not that of one small
booth in the pluralist bazaar. It is more like that of Anglicanism in England. The
BSA is enormous. It is deeply intertwined with the state, to a degree unmatched by
any other youth organization. Its success in these respects is the result of its calculated decision to present itself as universalistic rather than particularistic. It is pretty
late in the day for the BSA to be presenting itself as one competitor among many.
The BSA is the largest civic youth organization in the United States, and perhaps
in the world. More than eighty-seven million boys have belonged to BSA, and in
1992 over a million adults were active members.132 Fifty percent of all American boys

127. Quoted in Dale, 530 U.S. at 643.
128. Sudetic, supra note 123, at 105.
129. Id.
130. Id. See also Clark, supra note 61, at 562-63 n.199.
131. The same point could be made about political parties. A broad right of noncommercial association
would not only hamstring antidiscrimination law, it would also render unconstitutional much of existing election law, which pervasively regulates party primaries. See Samuel Issacharoff, Private Parties With Public
Purposes: Political Parties, Associational Freedoms, and Partisan Competition, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 274
(2001).
132. See Dale 530 U.S. at 697 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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between the ages of seven and ten are Cub Scouts, and twenty percent between eleven
and eighteen are Boy Scouts.133
Since 1916, the BSA has held a Congressional charter.134 The BSA is exempted
from a federal statute that bars civilians from wearing uniforms resembling those of
the armed forces.135 Every President since Taft has served as BSA’s honorary president. Congress has authorized the military to loan equipment to the Scouts without
charge, and to sell the BSA obsolete or surplus material.136 Every four years, the National Jamboree, a huge camping festival that attracts tens of thousands of Scouts from
all over the world, is hosted by Fort A.P. Hill in Virginia, a U.S. military base.137
From the beginning the Scouts have emphasized their inclusiveness. One historian of the BSA notes that an important asset of the organization was that it “adopted a
point of view attuned to a democratically minded citizenry and opened its ranks freely
to all creeds, races, and classes.”138 Official materials declare that “[n]either [our federal] charter nor the bylaws of the Boy Scouts of America permits the exclusion of
any boy.”139 One typical publication urges representatives to give a “[p]ersonal invitation to every boy in school to join scouting.”140 The Scouts are declared by their bylaws to be “absolutely nonsectarian.”141 The Scouts have managed to identify themselves with the nation as a whole. “Perhaps the BSA’s greatest image-building
triumph was its appropriation of the symbols of American nationhood.”142 Bitter differences of religion and ethnicity have been avoided. The history of the Scouts with
respect to race is less admirable, but even here the organization has become increasingly inclusive, and it is well ahead of the rest of America.143
133. Brief for Respondent at 1, Dale (No. 99-699).
134. See 36 U.S.C.A. §§ 30901-30908 (2003).
135. DAVID I. MACLEOD, BUILDING CHARACTER IN THE AMERICAN BOY: THE BOY SCOUTS, YMCA, AND
THEIR FORERUNNERS, 1870-1920 157 (1983); see 10 U.S.C.A. § 772(j)(1) (2003).
136. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 2554(a) (2002) (authorizing the loaning of equipment at Scout Jamborees); 10
U.S.C.A. § 4682 (2003) (authorizing the sale of obsolete Army equipment); 10 U.S.C.A. § 7541 (2002) (authorizing the sale or gift of Navy equipment); 10 U.S.C.A. § 9682 (2003) (authorizing the sale of obsolete Air Force
equipment); 14 U.S.C.A. § 641 (2003) (authorizing the gift or sale of Coast Guard equipment to BSA or any
public body or private, non-profit organization); see also 16 U.S.C.A. § 539f (2003) (waiver of rental fees in
National Forest System not restricted to BSA).
137. Sudetic, supra note 123, at 109. The support provided by the military is prodigious, involving the active assistance of nearly 1500 uniformed members. See Ken Perrote & Yvonne L. Smith, A.P. Hill Support
Contributes to Success of Scout Jamboree, MDW News Service (Aug. 6, 2001) available at
http://www.mdw.army.mil/content/anmviewer.asp?a=607&z=13.
138. HAROLD P. LEVY, BUILDING A POPULAR MOVEMENT: A CASE STUDY OF THE PUBLIC RELATIONS OF
THE BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA 21 (1944).
139. Quoted in Brief for Respondent at 1, Dale (No. 99-699).
140. Id. at 2.
141. Id. at 3.
142. MACLEOD, supra note 135, at 178.
143. In its early days, the organization was as racist as the rest of American society. “The first American
Boy Scout handbook included Baden-Powell’s mnemonic device for ‘N’ in Morse code, a cartoon of a ‘Nimble
Nig’ (the dot) chased by a crocodile (the dash).” Id. at 212. The BSA’s executive board decided that it would
sanction no black troop without local council approval, and the southern whites’ veto was in constant use. One
board member answered a critic by noting that to admit black boys “would lose us many white Scouts. . . .” Id.
Where there was no established council, the organization simply refused to register blacks. The Chief Scout
Executive, James West, foresaw “great mischief . . . if we permit the organization of colored troops in some
very small community, even with the consent of the superintendent of schools and other representative people.
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Another early success was the monopolization of the term “Boy Scout.” There
were other organizations that used the term when the BSA was founded, but they were
eclipsed by the success of BSA. “[W]ithin its first year of life this organization succeeded in absorbing every other active boy scout group but one—the American Boy
Scouts which, though a formidable competitor, also passed from existence before
1920.”144 This triumph was abetted by the Congressional charter enacted in 1916,
which gave the BSA the exclusive right to use the name of Boy Scouts. This was
promptly followed by successful legal action against the competitor organization,
which was forced to change its name and did not survive.145
After this long history of inclusiveness, the decision of the BSA leadership to
plunge into the culture wars betrayed the expectations of much of the membership.
Although the Boy Scouts are not an actual monopoly,146 they have enormous market power. The next largest youth organization, Camp Fire USA, has less than a quarter of the Scouts’ membership.147 Membership in the Boy Scouts has a nationally understood meaning. If you tell someone you are an Eagle Scout, no further explanation
is necessary. No other youth organization has such universal recognition or such
enormous cultural resonance.148
It is commonly said that those who disagree with the Scouts’ policies need not be
members. If an association is going to develop a coherent voice at all, its internal
means of addressing dissent has to be respected by the law.149 Exit is a common
method of dissent, and the characteristic means of control in free markets. However,
as the classic study of the exit option observes, when an organization provides a public good, it is not really possible to exit.150 A young man can resign from the Scouts,
but he must still live in a society in which the only boys’ organization with quasiofficial status publicly stands for the proposition that gay people are inherently defective and contaminating.
Judge McConnell’s policy argument for freedom of association analogizes that
freedom with freedom of religion.151 The analogy is problematic, because no religion
Suppose this small community eventually becomes part of a county council or district council—it would work
havoc and be an unnecessary embarrassment to overcome.” Id. at 213. In the North, there were black troops,
but most troops were segregated. In some cases, segregation was imposed by the leadership. Id. at 213-14.
Eventually, this policy was relaxed, and in the late 1920s and 1930s (a time when the nation as a whole exhibited little concern about racial injustice) southern councils began to accept black troops, encouraged by a promotion campaign undertaken by the national office. “Stanley Harris, field executive for the South, estimated
that by 1939, 50,000 of the nation’s 1,449,103 Boy Scouts were black.” Id. at 214.
144. LEVY, supra note 138, at 19.
145. MACLEOD, supra note 135, at 156-57.
146. This is emphasized in Epstein, supra note 63, at 136-39.
147. The Boy Scouts of America has a total membership of approximately three million. See supra note
121. Camp Fire USA reports a membership of 735,000, of whom half are girls and therefore are not eligible for
membership in the BSA. See http://www.campfire.org/all_about_us (last visited April 10, 2003).
148. The Girl Scouts come close, with 2.8 million girl members and 942,000 adult members; see
http://www.girlscouts.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2002); but they obviously do not compete with the Boy
Scouts.
149. See Steffen N. Johnson, Expressive Association and Organizational Autonomy, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1639
(2001).
150. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 98-105 (1970).
151. Supra, part III B, 2.
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in the United States represents an overwhelming majority of the pertinent population
in the way that the Scouts do. If we put some pressure on the analogy, we will see the
important ways in which freedom of association is legally constrained, to the benefit
of the BSA, even after Dale.
In a regime of free association like that which has prevailed in the religion area,
the Scouts would face a real possibility of schism over the homosexuality issue.152 In
February 2001, the New York City board of the Scouts declared that the national organization’s ban on gays was “repugnant” and “stupid.”153 New York’s leadership
later joined with those of Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Philadelphia, Minneapolis, and Orange County, California, in proposing that the ban be discarded.154
Yet none of these cities’ councils has officially rejected the national policy. The national organization has too much leverage over them for them to do that. Philadelphia’s council tried to adopt a nondiscrimination policy in May 2003, but quickly reversed itself after pressure from the national organization.155
American churches have divided in the past over fundamental moral differences.
When Northern and Southern churches disagreed about slavery, the Presbyterians,
Methodists and Baptists each split into separate regional churches.156 Similarly, today
there is a serious danger of division over the moral status of homosexual conduct
among Presbyterians, Lutherans, Episcopalians, and Methodists.157

152. Nancy Rosenblum offers schism as the healthiest solution to the problem of discriminatory associations. See ROSENBLUM, supra note 92, at 170-71.
153. The New York board acted, in part, in response to a threat by the New York City government to prohibit its agencies from sponsoring Scout activities. Eric Lipton, Local Scouting Board, Calling Gay Ban “Stupid,” Urges End to Nat’l Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2001, at A21.
154. See Nine Scout Councils Request BSA National to Stop Discrimination Against Gays,
http://www.scoutingforall.org/aaic/100101.shtml. Thus far, however, this movement has not succeeded in getting any modification of the national policy. The organization responded by enacting a resolution reaffirming
the gay exclusion and stating that there is no local option to the contrary. Boy Scouts of America, BSA Board
Affirms
Traditional
Leadership
Standards,
News
Release
(Feb.
2002)
available
at
http://www.scouting.org/nav/enter.jsp?s=mc&c=fs (last visited April 7, 2003). The reformers seem unlikely to
succeed because conservative religious organizations are so strong within the BSA. “[R]eligious bodies now
sponsor 65 percent of all troops, compared with just over 40 percent 15 years ago.” Benjamin Soskis, Big Tent:
Saving the Boy Scouts from its Supporters, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 17, 2001 at 18. Of these, two-thirds are sponsored by the Catholic Church, the United Methodist Church, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
(the Mormons), the Lutherans, and the National Council of Young Israel. Brief of Amicus National Catholic
Committee on Scouting et al. in Support of Petitioners at 1, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000)
(No. 99-699). Of these, the Mormons “sponsor more Scout troops and packs than any other religious or civic
group in the country.” Lesley Stahl, The Boy Scouts: Policy of the Boy Scouts to Disallow Homosexuals Into
Their Ranks, 60 Minutes, April 1, 2001, CBS News Transcripts. The Mormons are less than two percent of the
American population, but more than 12% of all Scouts and 23% of all Scout troops. Sudetic, supra note 123, at
105; Tracy Thompson, Scouting and the New Terrain, WASHINGTON POST MAGAZINE, Aug. 2, 1998. “Almost
all of the church’s top leaders achieved the rank of Eagle Scout as young men, and Mormon elders use the Boy
Scout program as an integral part of its youth ministry.” Sudetic, supra note 123, at 109. The Mormon leadership has a remarkably retrograde view of homosexuality, one that sanctions even violent abuse of gay people,and that appears not to follow in any apparent way from Mormon theology. See Katherine Rosman, Mormon Family Values, THE NATION, Feb. 25, 2002.
155. See Sara Rimer, Boy Scouts Under Fire: Ban on Gays Is at Issue, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2003, at A19.
156. See SYDNEY E. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 659-65 (1972).
157. See David Van Biema, Out of the Fold? The Debate over Gay Ordination and Same-Sex Unions Poses
a Critical Choice for Mainline Protestants: Embrace or Schism?, TIME, July 3, 2000 at 48; Dave Condren,
Presbyterian Church Faces Split over Same-Sex Unions, BUFFALO NEWS, March 12, 2001, at B1; Tom Heinen,
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When these religious splits have occurred, the state has remained neutral. After
the rift over slavery, the respective factions on both sides of the Mason-Dixon line
continued to call themselves Presbyterians, Methodists and Baptists, and to follow the
rituals of their respective denominations. Neither side attempted to enjoin these practices by the other. More recently, the Society of St. Pius X is a group of Catholics
who from 1988 to 2002 were in schism from the Church, their leaders excommunicated by the Pope, because of their rejection of the Vatican II reforms.158 A number of
churches of the Society operate in the United States, and it has hundreds of members
here.159 During the schism, they celebrated the Catholic Mass using the priestly clothing and language traditionally associated with the church. No effort was ever made by
the Church to claim that these rituals and symbols were its intellectual property, or to
legally enjoin the Society from operating as it did.
The law of intellectual property does not compel this result. Religious groups are
protected as much as other groups from competitors with similar names, on principles
analogous to those applied in trademark and trade name cases.160 Present law might
well have authorized the Pope to enjoin Martin Luther from calling himself a “Christian.” What has kept this rule from being a disaster for American religious pluralism
is that few religious denominations have tried to enjoin each other from existing,161
and nothing of this sort happened in the major divisions just noted.
There is, however, every reason to think that the Boy Scouts of America would
use the law to crush any schism within its ranks. Any troop that separated from the
BSA would have to give up its uniforms and its curriculum.162 It would have to alter
itself in a fundamental way. If it attempted to continue while disavowing the anti-gay
policy, the BSA would presumably get an injunction to force it to stop identifying itself as a Boy Scout troop.

Lutherans Address Same-Sex Unions, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 16, 2001, at 1B; Caryle Murphy, Confrontation Reveals Episcopal Split; Conservatives Attempt to Develop a Parallel, Supportive Church Hierarchy,
WASH. POST, June 2, 2001, at B9; John Rivera, Deep and Difficult Differences Trouble Episcopalians in U.S.,
BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 4, 2001, at 1F; Bruce Nolan, Methodist Split Not Seen as Answer, Bishop Says, but
Church Still Deeply Divided on Gay Issue, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 15, 2004. There is also a
danger of schism over the issue within the worldwide Anglican church. See STEPHEN BATES, A CHURCH AT
WAR: ANGLICANS AND HOMOSEXUALITY (2004).
158. See FATHERS OF THE HOLY CROSS SEMINARY, MOST-ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SOCIETY OF ST.
PIUS X (1997); Associated Press, The World: Catholics Close a Historic Rift, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2002, at A7.
159. See John C. Ensslin, Sanctuary St. Isidore Parish Flowers Despite Rift With Catholic Church, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, March 25, 2001, at 44A; see also http://www.sspx.org (listing statistics for the American
District).
160. See generally Jed Michael Silversmith and Jack Achiezer Guggenheim, Between Heaven and Earth:
The Interrelationship Between Intellectual Property Rights and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment,
52 ALA. L. REV. 467 (2001); Howard J. Alperin, Annotation, Right of Charitable or Religious Association or
Corporation to Protection Against Use of Same or Similar Name by Another, 37 A.L.R.3D 277 (1971).
161. There are, however, some significant religious groups that have used intellectual property rights to
prevent schism. See, e.g., Christian Science Bd. of Dirs. v. Nolan, 259 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 2001); General Conf.
Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Perez, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (S.D. Fla. 2000); Church of Scientology Int’l v.
Elmira Mission of the Church of Scientology, 794 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986).
162. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Teal, 374 F. Supp. 1276 (E.D. Pa. 1974), and cases cited therein (enjoining
operation of “Havertown Sea Scouts”).
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What the BSA leadership has after Dale is the best of both worlds: freedom of association protects their right to discriminate, but their Congressional charter and intellectual property law prevents dissenting factions, even those with tens of thousands of
members, from splitting off. If the religion analogy is accepted, then it should be
pushed to its limits and the Scouts exposed to the dangers of schism that American religions routinely cope with.163 Of course, the Supreme Court, having decided to protect the Scouts in Dale, could not then order that their intellectual property protections
be lifted. It has no authority to do so. But that is one more reason why these matters
should have been left to the legislature, which has the flexibility to craft solutions of
this kind.
The present regime does not uniformly reflect the preferences of local associations. The application of antidiscrimination law would be a great relief to some local
councils, who after Dale are squeezed between their own gay-tolerant moral beliefs
(and those of their donors and members) and the national policy. The anti-gay policy
has become a powerful obstacle to fundraising and the recruitment of volunteers in
precisely those urban areas where the benefits of Scouting are most urgently needed.
“There are probably a hundred positive things that scouting affords young people,”
commented Lewis Greenblatt, president of the Chicago Area Council of the BSA.
“This is one of the few negative things that is going on in scouting. In Chicago, our
core group is kids from the inner city. Scouting offers them some extremely positive
reinforcement that they don’t otherwise get.” Chicago’s council has expressed its disagreement with the national policy, but it is not openly repudiating it. “We’ve gone
about as far as we can go. We’re right up to the line.”164
The Chicago council would be greatly strengthened in its negotiations with national headquarters if the Council were constitutionally subject to the Chicago human
rights ordinance. It could tell headquarters that it had no choice but to comply, while
telling locals forthrightly that it does not discriminate.165 Counsel could then do its local work with the homosexuality issue firmly off the table. The controversy over antigay discrimination, which the Chicago council did not invite, would disappear. The
Dale decision has made it impossible to resolve the issue in this way.
Dale is, then, at least to some extent, a defeat rather than a victory for pluralism.
The pluralist argument depends on a simplistic, binary view of the constraints on association, in which associations are either subject to state power or absolutely free to
organize themselves as they see fit. In fact, as the Chicago case shows, associations
actually operate in a complex web of constraints, including the state, their umbrella

163. Yael Tamir argues that the proper remedy for exclusion from dominant associations is for the state to
provide citizens with “a network of state-sponsored services that would lessen their dependency on the associations to which they belong.” Yael Tamir, Revisiting the Civic Sphere, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 214, 232
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1998). The regime that prevails after Dale is just the reverse of this: the quasi-official association is precisely the one doing the discriminating, and of course the state provides no alternative.
164. Telephone interview with Lewis Greenblatt, President of Chicago Area Council of the BSA (Oct. 22,
2002).
165. Chicago in fact had been attempting to enforce its human rights ordinance against the Scouts when the
Dale decision was handed down. See Chicago Council of Boy Scouts of Am. v. City of Chicago, 748 N.E.2d
759 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001), appeal denied, 763 N.E.2d 316 (Ill. 2001).
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organizations, and various groups of constituents, including donors, volunteers, and
members. Eliminating state control does not always increase a local association’s
ability to reflect the preferences of its members. In many of the nation’s largest cities,
the opposite has been the case.166 Local scout troops are bullied by a distant bureaucracy; that bureaucracy just happens to be a non-state entity.
The libertarianism of Dale is analogous to that of United States v. E.C. Knight
Co.,167 which held that Congress had no power to regulate a trust that controlled 98%
of the country’s sugar refining industry. The Supreme Court’s disabling of government power did not empower anybody except the monopolists who controlled the
trust. Similarly here, the Court’s constraint on public power produces a hypertrophy
of private power. Judge McConnell would read the religion clauses to “protect against
government-induced uniformity in matters of religion,”168 and his argument for freedom of association suggests similar concerns. Yet the Dale case has itself induced
uniformity. Had the case come out the other way, the result would be different in different states. The Scouts might be forbidden to discriminate in Chicago except where
individual troops invoke a right of intimate association,169 but it is most unlikely that
the Scouts would be thus restricted in Salt Lake City. This proliferation of options is
one of the traditional strengths of federalism.170
The problem in the Dale case thus resembles the problem described in what
economists call the theory of the second best.171 The theory holds that when many
markets are not competitive, it may be counter-efficient to attack monopolies in only
some segments of the market. Consumers may respond to the regulation by shifting to
unregulated activities that are even more inefficient than the activities that regulation
drove them away from, resulting in a net efficiency loss. Here, if the Scouts possess a
quasi-monopoly over a valuable cultural resource, freeing them from state regulation
will not improve the market. It may just produce still greater consumer dissatisfaction. If the first best solution of free association is not available, a message-based approach may be the second best.

166. See supra text accompanying note 154 (noting resistance to the policy from New York City, Chicago,
Los Angeles, San Francisco, Philadelphia, Minneapolis, and Orange County, California).
167. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
168. McConnell, supra note 84, at 194.
169. The Scouts’ Supreme Court brief emphasized that “[t]roops are incontrovertibly small, closely knit
groups.” Brief for Petitioner at 40, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). It also cited the right of
parents to direct the upbringing of their chidren. See id. at 42-44. These arguments were of no avail in
Dale,because the intimate associations involved in scouting were not the entities that decided to do the discriminating. That decision originated in a distant headquarters in Texas, without the participation or even the
knowledge of local groups. But if the adult leaders of an individual troop wanted to exclude gays, they would
have had a powerful claim.
170. See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Framers’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484,
1493-94 (1987).
171. The classic exposition is Kevin Lancaster & R.G. Lipsey, The General Theory of the Second Best, 24
REV. OF ECON. STUD. 11 (1956).
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V
RULES OF LAW
The argument just offered challenges the Optimistic story, but the Distrust problem has not yet been addressed. Absent Optimism, though, Distrust lead us to a very
different judicial rule than the one contemplated by the neolibertarians.
Distrust was a pervasive theme in the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Employment
Division v. Smith.172 In that case, the Court, largely consolidating a trend of the previous cases,173 held that the Free Exercise Clause does not authorize the courts to carve
out exemptions to generally applicable laws when such laws burden religious activities.174 One reason why the Court declined to protect religious activities was that a
different rule would require it to assess the burden that any law placed on religious activities,175 which in turn would require it to scrutinize the beliefs of the religious.
Scalia’s reservations about that procedure look a lot like Carpenter’s and Epstein’s
reservations about a message-based approach to freedom of association:
It is no more appropriate for judges to determine the “centrality” of religious beliefs before
applying a “compelling interest” test in the free exercise field, than it would be for them to
determine the “importance” of ideas before applying the “compelling interest” test in the free
speech field. What principle of law or logic can be brought to bear to contradict a believer’s
assertion that a particular act is “central” to his personal faith? Judging the centrality of different religious practices is akin to the unacceptable “business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims.” . . . Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have
warned that courts must not presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion
176
or the plausibility of a religious claim.

The rule that remains after Smith protects religion only against intentional interference motivated by animus against a specific religion.177 If one similarly distrusts
judges’ ability fairly to discern and weigh the importance of associations’ messages,
one might follow the reasoning of Smith by concluding that associations should have
similar protection: only laws that deliberately burden them because of their viewpoint
should be deemed to violate the First Amendment.178
Before Dale, of course, the Court had a more protective rule than this: if it could
be shown that a nondiscrimination law burdened an association’s ability to express its
viewpoint, then the law would be invalid unless it was necessary to a compelling state
interest. The reason for the additional protection, as noted earlier, is that some associations really are so closely associated with specific speech that the associations are
practically inseparable from the speech. But deciding whether this is so in any particular case depends on a fact-specific investigation, with all the dangers of subjectivity and balancing that repulsed the Court in Smith.179 The difference between the two
172. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
173. See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1277-82 (1994).
174. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79.
175. Id. at 886-87.
176. Id.
177. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
178. The anomaly of Scalia’s providing the fifth vote in Dale is explored in detail in Clark, supra note 61.
179. This is noted by Carpenter, supra note 2, at 1539.
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cases is that in the case of religion, it is well settled that courts may not interpret religious doctrines.180 But this is entailed by the requirement that government not make
pronouncements of religious truth,181 a requirement that is not relevant to most cases
of freedom of association.182
The message-based approach does have the effect of offering protection only to
the most obviously prejudiced speakers. Epstein’s question deserves an answer.
“Why should the First Amendment protect only the extremes of the political distribution, but not the associational preferences of large, mainstream organizations?”183
The answer is that social meanings are not innocuous. Antidiscrimination law
presumes, and experience amply shows, that patterns of discrimination and exclusion
will perpetuate themselves absent legal intervention, and that this justifies such intervention. The law is intervening to try to change social meanings. The message-based
approach does put pressure on the culture to become less discriminatory, but it does so
in a way respectful of speech, particularly the speech of those who most disagree with
the government’s position.
Jennifer Gerarda Brown argues that states should enact disclosure requirements
that would require associations to disclose their discriminatory policies as the price for
exemption from antidiscrimination laws. Such requirements would ensure that people
know the messages that they are associating with when they join, and so would facilitate more informed decisions to associate.184 Brown’s proposal is attractive, but she
does not notice how close we now are to the regime she proposes. The Dale litigation
forced the Scouts to be open about their discriminatory policy and thus made salient
an exclusion that had previously been tacit and thus normalized.185
Antidiscrimination law does not defer to the market. It skews its operation in just
the way that a message-based approach skews the operation of associations. Kimberly
Yuracko has shown that the prohibition of sex discrimination in employment has isolated exceptions. Some of these derive from gender-based concerns of personal privacy: hospitals can discriminate in hiring nurses in maternity wards, and retirement
homes can discriminate when they hire personal caregivers for their patients. More
interesting is the case of businesses that sell sexual titillation. Strip clubs can discriminate when they hire strippers, but businesses are not permitted to discriminate for
the sake of “plus sex” marketing, which packages sexual titillation together with other
products. To take one well-known example, airlines may not discriminate on the basis

180. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S.
696 (1976); Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1872).
181. See Koppelman, supra note 86, at 108-113.
182. This requirement is relevant to the autonomy of religious associations, which is why the Dale rule has
been successfully invoked only by religious groups such as the Nation of Islam. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. The exemption of religious groups from antidiscrimination law is in this way not an exception to
Smith but an application of its principles.
183. Epstein, supra note 63, at 130.
184. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Facilitating Boycotts of Discriminatory Organizations Through an Informed Association Statute, 87 MINN. L. REV. 481 (2002).
185. See Marc R. Poirier, Hastening the Kulturkampf: Boy Scouts of America v. Dale and the Politics of
American Masculinity, 12 L. & SEXUALITY 271 (2003).
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of sex in order to combine air travel with alluring flight attendants.186 Yuracko explains, “[W]hen deciding sexual-titillation cases, courts effectively do two things: (1)
they rigidly divide the work world between sex and nonsex businesses, and (2) they
police the boundaries between these categories to ensure that the nonsex world does
not shrink, even though it may grow.”187 This rule makes sense, because the sexualization of the workplace “alters the way [women] are treated by others so that their intellectual and professional attributes are simply less likely to be recognized and encouraged.”188 Such focus on the body also has a detrimental effect on the performance
of the women themselves.189 Constricting the market makes people freer.
Like plus-sex businesses, invisible-discrimination associations aren’t allowed to
exist. You can avoid the application of antidiscrimination law only by openly and notoriously discriminating. But when you do that, you scare away some of the customers. And this becomes a powerful incentive not to discriminate.
Does this effect itself create First Amendment difficulties? Is the state, under this
rationale, suppressing speech in order to suppress its message? Carpenter correctly
observes that under a message-based approach, ambiguity is likely to be construed
against associations that want to discriminate.190 More importantly, silence itself can
sometimes be a message.
Gay advocates understand that silence signals tacit disapproval of gay-rights claims, or at the
very least embarrassment and shame about the subject. . . . [A]gainst the backdrop of loud,
continuous, and insistent demands to discuss and take sides on gay-rights claims, a steadfast
refusal to talk at all about the issue is hardly neutral. It is itself a position, a “message.” It is
like the schoolchild who remains silent while students all around him recite the Pledge of Allegiance. . . . Preserving traditional sexual morality is the goal; silence is the method. We
may not like the goal or the method. But if the First Amendment secures some space in
which to develop one’s own identity, it surely guarantees enough to prevent the evolution of
191
that identity in a direction the state demands.

But freedom of speech does not mean a right to engage in otherwise prohibited conduct in order to send a message, nor does it authorize one to disregard generally applicable laws whenever compliance with them will be taken by onlookers to send a message.192
A law that precludes silent discrimination does not necessarily burden speech. Silence is not always a message. At least some entities that discriminate are not thinking about sending any message at all. An absolute right of noncommercial entities to
associate, Marshall observes, “is overbroad because it protects discrimination wholly
removed from the expressive goals of the organization.”193 So when the messagebased approach collides with the determined silence of the Scouts, the collision is less

186. See Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971).
187. Kimberly Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex Discrimination,
92 CALIF. L. REV. 147, 196 (2004).
188. Id. at 205.
189. Id. At 205-09.
190. Carpenter, supra note 2, at 1542.
191. Id. at 1556-57, footnotes omitted.
192. See Koppelman, supra note 17, at 1826-35.
193. William P. Marshall, Discrimination and the Right of Association, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 68, 79 (1986).
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like West Virginia v. Barnette194 than it is like Clark v. Community for Creative NonViolence:195 the First Amendment does not bar application of a law that prohibits conduct that is not itself inherently communicative, even if the defendant engages in the
conduct for communicative reasons, so long as the law does not define the prohibited
conduct by reference to the viewpoint that is communicated.
Does it matter that government’s purpose is to shape the culture? But the law
does this all the time. When persons are forbidden to discriminate, this makes it more
likely that they will develop less discriminatory attitudes. When persons are forbidden to steal, this makes it more likely that they will develop greater respect for others’
property. When any conduct is prohibited, preferences tend to adapt so that the conduct is no longer desired. These effects are not unintended. That they are intended,
however, does not mean that the laws violate the First Amendment. People’s preferences are inevitably shaped in nonrational ways by their environment, and law is part
of that environment. Typically, neither racists nor nonracists arrive at their positions
through a process of rational deliberation. Antidiscrimination law redirects these nonrational processes in a way that ameliorates severe and pervasive harms. As George
Sher asks, “exactly what is disrespectful about taking (benign) advantage of a causal
process that would occur anyhow?”196
A message-based rule, in short, raises the cost of discrimination. If you raise the
cost of anything, you’ll get less of it. This effect can already be seen in the aftermath
of Dale, when the Scouts suffered a decline in their membership. In the course of litigation—and certainly once the case was over—the Scouts became so associated with
discrimination against gays that they now almost certainly could satisfy the Roberts
test. Their fate is a warning to other groups. Discrimination is not free. Nor should it
be.
VI
CONCLUSION
Dale is a mess, but the upshot of the mess is that we still have the old messagebased rule of Roberts. An association is more likely to win immunity from an antidiscrimination law, the more clearly its message is a discriminatory one. Dale is in some
tension with this rule, but the opinion is so muddled that it establishes no new rule to
displace the old one. And this is not a bad place to end up.
In the end, we have a choice of pathologies. We can either live with the little pathologies created by the message-based rule, or with the big pathologies that would be
created by either of the large and clear rules—absolute protection for discrimination,
or no freedom of association at all—between which it uneasily perches. Ambiguity
has its virtues. There is this much to be said for the Court’s confused opinion in Dale:
it has thickened the fog where clarity would be deadly.

194. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
195. 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
196. GEORGE SHER, BEYOND NEUTRALITY: PERFECTIONISM AND POLITICS 73 (1997).

